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Abstract  
Religious beliefs are accepted to be one of the main motivations for financial 
actions. The economic theory fails to provide an adequate foundation to study 
the link between religiosity and economic behavior. A number of empirical 
studies discusses the role of religion on the financial behavior of economic 
agents yet more research needs to be conducted. This study provides a brief 
review on how religiosity might affect financial behavior by the inclusion of 
recent studies. In addition to the empirical research that is based on European 
countries, we discuss the differences in different geographies and finance 
schemes. We also debate the potential factors that affect differing behavioral 
aspects with respect to religiosity. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Max Weber, there is an active debate on the role of religion on people's economic 
attitudes and economic development of countries. The economic theory to elucidate the role 
that culture plays in economic decision is however almost non-existent. This is possibly due 
to the systematic tendency to involve culture into analysis under rational behavior. The 
relation between culture and economic outcomes is also vague and has few testable design 
(Guiso et al. 2006). Some empirical researches so far have examined the role of culture 
(religion) on certain economic outcomes, however, as argued by Guisso et al. (2003), the 
evidence in this line of research is based on cross-country sample in which the impact is 
confounded by differences in other institutional factors. Guisso et al. (2003) address a 
number of empirical limitations and investigate the relation between religious traits and 
various economic patterns. By studying religion across wide variety of geography, the 
authors give a rigorous and rich insight into different religions, even so, they cannot conclude 
which religion is more conducive for successful economic outcome. It is therefore safe to 
argue that there are at least plenty of venues pending for research on the impact of religiosity.  
 
One potential mechanism through which religion affects economic behavior is the possible 
link between religiosity and risk attitudes. On several grounds risk aversion affects economic 
behavior such as on the realm of savings (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 2008; Noussair et al. 
2014), insurance demand (Eeckhoudt et al. 1997) and household finance (Renneboog and 
Spaenjers 2012).  The other strand of the literature complements the link between religiosity 
and economic outcomes by bringing extensive evidence on the positive impact of religiosity 
on risk aversion (Miller and Hoffmann, 1995; Osoba, 2003; Noussair et al. 2014).  Specific 
to the area of finance, the religiosity is examined in terms of its influence in the conduct of 
lending business. The extensive evidence suggests that religiosity of customers lead to lax 
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lending standards (Kim et al. 2014), reduced risk-taking (Kanagaretnama 2015) and lower 
loan interest spreads (Chen et al. 2016).  
 
Though the impact of religiosity on economic behavior is in general attached to countries 
where Christian population dominates, this can hold true for people who have devotion to 
Islamic beliefs as well. A flourishing literature examines the behavioral aspects in Islamic 
finance. This line of research arguably grows in two broad dimensions. On the one side, the 
lending behavior of Islamic banks are comparatively examined, by pointing out the 
differences between Islamic and conventional finance. On the other side, the impact of 
religiosity is studied on financial behavior with respect to the religiosity of customers. 
Therefore, while the first dimension examines how different jurisdictions and religious codes 
impact bank institutions, the second dimension is very much related to the behavioral aspects 
of customers.  
 
In light of the ongoing debate on the channels through which religiosity affects financial 
behavior, it is timely to present a review of the recent literature on conventional and Islamic 
finance to highlight the main areas of interest and future research. This paper aims to review 
the literature on conventional finance in its link to religiosity as a first step. Then, our 
discussion will extend to Islamic finance as a unique finance scheme and its relation to 
religiosity. Our focus is thus to provide insights both into conventional and Islamic finance 
with an emphasis on different geographies and cultures. Unlike previous surveys that focus 
on Islamic and conventional finance in a holistic way without a specific focus, we are 
selective on the literature and limit ourselves to the papers that discuss the issue in the context 
of religious traits in both finance schemes. In doing so, we are able to plainly discuss the 
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relation between religiosity and finance business by Islamic and conventional comparison. 
The present paper overall not only will discuss the research theme on a comparative baseline 
but will also inform the policymakers about different finance schemes that can vitalize 
product diversification, financial inclusion and revenue generation. 
 
The remaining sections discuss the issues under the sections of Islamic and conventional 
finance. The next section presents the papers in the context of conventional finance in general. 
This section will review the channels how religiosity impacts various features of 
conventional finance business. The following section focuses on the theme from Islamic 
finance perspective through a relatively more extensive discussion. That section first 
presents basic pillars in Islamic finance and how it differs from conventional finance. The 
impact of religious beliefs will then be the final point of discussion in that section. Religiosity 
will be discussed from customer and institutional perspectives. This is potentially important 
since we argue that the seemingly different behavioral traits triggered by religious beliefs 
might be in fact due to the institutional factors that govern Islamic finance. The last section 
concludes with a summary and suggests venues for future research. 
2. Religiosity in Conventional Finance 
A rising amount of research is devoted to understanding the role of religiosity as a cultural 
element of banking business. As Kanagaretnam et al. (2019) argue, the availability of data 
with the help of better statistical techniques have facilitated to discover the link between 
religiosity and financial decisions. The extensive evidence suggests that religions have 
significant and diverse bearing on risk behavior of individuals. Renneboog and Spaenjers 
(2012), for instance, investigate the impact of religion on the financial behavior of Dutch 
Christian community. The authors find that, with increasing religiosity, households are more 
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likely to save. Given the catholic and protestant denominations, the differences are also 
visible, for instance, catholic households are less likely to invest in stocks. In addition, their 
findings suggest that Catholics attach more importance to thrift and are more averse, while 
Protestants are found to have higher financial responsibility. Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) 
extend these findings to Jewish versus Christian community comparison and find that risk 
preferences of these religious communities exhibit substantial differences too. Noussair et al. 
(2013) also present similar findings as they find strong confirmatory evidence that more 
religious people, as they measure by church membership or attendance, are more risk averse 
toward financial risks. They however conflict with Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012), who 
find evidence of Catholics being more risk averse, and find that Protestants are more risk 
averse than Catholics in such task. 
 
Though the impact of religion on individual behavior to finance is a commonly agreed 
phenomenon, the pertinent literature suggests that a similar impact is also relevant in 
corporate space. An example of the studies in finance is Hilary and Hui (2009), amongst 
others, who find evidence that firms in counties with higher religiosity exhibit higher risk 
aversion. The authors further argue that religions shape cultural values and affect individual 
decision-making, thereby enhance business ethics and constrain opportunistic behavior in 
business contracting and financial reporting. Their findings are in compliance with many 
others, for example, Callen and Fang (2015) demonstrate that the US companies located in 
counties with higher religiosity have a lower risk of stock price crash. The authors explain 
their findings with the power of religious social norms that function to reduce managerial 
hoarding of bad stock news. In a similar vein, Grullon et al. (2010) refer to community values 
that are driven by community religious beliefs which in turn affect corporate behavior. The 
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authors find that firm managers in religious US cities are less likely to present undesirable 
corporate behavior such as backdating stock options and aggressive earnings management, 
and are thus less subject to lawsuits. Baxamusa and Jalal (2016) provide ancillary evidence 
which suggests that firms managed by Catholic CEOs have less leverage, issue less debt, 
present business diversification in its geographic locations, and have less investments 
compared to firms with Protestant CEOs. The authors also find that corporate actions are also 
reflected in the CEOs’ personal risk preferences such as stockholding habits and taste for 
risky sports. Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) document that banks in more religious countries 
tend to engage less in opportunistic earnings management. The authors accept this finding as 
an implication of the social norm theory which imply that seeking for approval from society 
is a basic objective for human attitudes. As a form of social norm enforcement, religiosity 
appears to exert control over societies and punish individuals who violate certain codes 
presented by religions. Conversely, those who behave in accordance with those norms may 
receive higher acceptance from societies as an implicit reward. The management of a 
corporation located in a highly religious area, therefore, is expected to act in compliance with 
social norms and abstain social sanctions. 
 
Specific to lending business, further researches confirmed that cultural dimension of finance 
is valid, and religion, as a robust proxy for culture, influences bank lending (Chen et al., 
2016; Kim et al., 2014; Abedifar et al. 2013; Kanagaretnam et al. 2015). Kim et al. (2014), 
for instance, by studying a data set of 12,545 syndicated loan facilities from 19 countries for 
the period 2003–2007, show that lenders loosen financing conditions to those borrowers who 
show strong ethical behavior. That study stresses that the shared ethical values between the 
lender and the borrower enhances loose financing, which further reveals that information 
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frictions are reduced in doing so. Chen et al. (2016) confirm Kim et al. (2014) in the sense 
that religiosity softens lending conditions and leads to lower loan interest spreads. What is 
more interesting, the authors find that religiosity replaces the role of legal environment as 
lower loan interest spreads is more pronounced in countries where creditor rights are weaker. 
The authors argue that this is due to the significant role that religious values play in 
constraining opportunistic behavior in weaker legal environment. Additional to the lower 
cost of loans, authors document other favorable conditions in lending when religiosity enters 
into play.  Religiosity, as an important factor to implicitly push lenders to act in accordance 
with ethical norms, is also well documented. Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) find evidence that 
religiosity constrains excessive risk-taking over a representative sample of international 
banking. Authors argue that borrowers’ implicit internal and external monitoring enhance 
with higher degree of religiosity which in turn disciplines lenders to take less risk. The 
disciplining role of religion is also emphasized by El Ghoul et al. (2012) who study a sample 
of 36,105 U.S. firm-year observations and document that the effect of religiosity on the cost 
of equity capital is larger for firms lacking alternative monitoring mechanisms which is 
measured by lower institutional ownership. The authors interpret this result as an evidence 
which supports the conjecture that religion plays as a corporate governance role in firm 
operations. Another intriguing finding of that study is that firms with lower visibility are 
more sensitive to religion, because, as the authors argue, they are more reliant on local social 
than economic factors because of suffering lower visibility. 
 
The social norm theory provides a useful tool for projecting light into some other studies 
which examine the relation between religiosity and corporate risk-taking and find evidence 
of a positive association between religiosity and risk aversion. Hilary and Hui (2009) find 
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that the volatility of return on assets and return on equity in US companies located in counties 
with higher religiosity is lower. Shu et al. (2011) demonstrate that mutual funds shun 
excessive risk in business environments where religiosity is observably intense. As would the 
social norm theory suggests, the firm managers in religious cities conform to the expectations 
of an average customer to avoid any costly implications of their objection. Although social 
norm theory attributes this line of behavior to the social pressure based on religious codes 
and cultural motives, the other rationale comes from Miller and Hoffman (1995) who argue 
that risk preference of individuals’ is very much related to religiosity. As religiosity 
translates itself to specific reward expectation after death, similarly non-participation of a 
belief is a representation of risk taking. Risk averse people are those who reject higher return 
and seek lower but a safer return. Religious people in the same logic are those who hedge 
against an unknown future where the loss and return can be extensively large. Abedifar et al 
(2013) implicitly confirm these findings as risk aversion is far high among those individuals 
whose devotion to religious belief are intense as well. Boone et al. (2013) examine whether 
religiosity plays any role in tax avoidance among corporate and individual taxpayers. The 
authors find that taxpayers in more religious US counties are more eager to avoid tax. The 
authors argue that this finding is attributable to their risk preference, as religious people are 
risk averse and prevent from the risk created by tax evasion, however potential other 
explanation could be the social norms of religious counties. In relation to the related literature 
that investigate the impact of religiosity on individual financial behavior, Boone et al. (2013) 
also find that religiosity is consistently associated with lower tax avoidance by individual 
taxpayers as well. Noussair et al. (2013) however argue that the seemingly strong relation 
between religion and risk aversion is in fact driven by the social aspects of church 
membership rather than the pure religious beliefs. Although the authors fail to present 
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adequate evidence on the channels that the social aspects of church membership affect risk 
behavior, the seemingly strong relation between social aspects of religious institutions and 
risk behavior provides some confirmation to the social norm theory. 
Religiosity reveals itself in the quality of financial reporting outcomes too. Dyreng et al. 
(2012) find that corporations operating in religious places generally have higher accrual 
quality, show less opportunistic earnings management, and are more transparent on reporting 
negative news. McGuire et al. (2012) also mention about superior accounting standards in 
those firms located in areas where religion is more intensely practiced. Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2015) give support for these findings from banking business. The authors conjecture that 
due to timely recognition and report of loan losses in banks driven by closer monitoring of 
religious customers, banks in more religious locations take less financial risk. Confirming 
their expectation, the authors find that banks in more religious countries exhibit lower risk 
and are less likely to encounter financial problem.   
3. Religiosity in Islamic Finance 
As this survey aims to discuss the impact of religiosity on financial behavior separately for 
Islamic and conventional finance, the key principles that make Islamic banking unique need 
to be emphasized. Islamic finance is based on Shariah principles which are either explicitly 
stated in the holy Quran or collectively agreed by scholars. Shariah principles first and 
foremost prohibit any financial transaction in the form of Riba, interest in conventional use. 
This does not necessarily mean that Shariah principles object to the time value of money, the 
compounded price of any economic value across time. Rather, according to Islamic finance, 
the goods and services can be purchased on deferred payment which can substantially differ 
from its current price. The basic difference between conventional and any Islamic contract is 
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the uncertainty that any party in an Islamic transaction needs to bear ahead. Islamic contracts 
therefore do not suggest any pre-determined return. Financial intermediaries in Islamic 
finance operate on this rule as well. The deposits, equity capital or Sukuk bonds through 
which an Islamic intermediary collects money are all purportedly non-interest bearing and 
therefore always carry the risk of loss which is very much translated as profit and loss sharing 
(PLS).  
 
The conventional finance theory falls short to fully analyze the basic pillars of Islamic 
banking. In principle, the Islamic banking departs from conventional banking since interest 
(riba) is prohibited in Islam. In this unique form of finance, banks are not permitted to charge 
predetermined interest rates on loans or savings. In accordance with the principles of 
Islam-Shariah, the Islamic banking model is ideally based on the PLS mechanism. The ideal 
representation of PLS mechanism is generally manifested in Mudarabah (profit-sharing) and 
Musharaka (joint venture) contracts. Under the PLS arrangement, customers enter into a 
business contract where bank assets and liabilities are shared in a predetermined agreement 
by which customers also share the risk in that specific agreement. The risk sharing nature of 
Islamic finance is therefore argued to contribute to the stability of the financial system as 
customers also take responsibility (Khan and Mirakhor 1989, Ebrahim and Safadi 1995, 
Iqbal 1997). The equity based like finance in this form of Islamic finance is therefore 
substantially encouraged by Islamic finance because it is widely believed that customers and 
their banks engage in closer mutual monitoring (Askari 2012). This form of financing is also 
in compatible with sustainable development because banks tend to provide more long-term 
financing with better risk-return profile (Chapra, 1992, Mills and Presley, 1999). 
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There are potentially fundamental other discrepancies between Islamic and conventional 
finance that render the former to higher risk exposure. It has been widely proposed that the 
risk profile of Islamic contracts profoundly differs from conventional contracts. One of the 
common difference originates from the very structure of ownership. In lease based financing 
instruments, for instance, the financier, as an (partial) owner of the commodity that is subject 
to that transaction, bears not only the credit risk but also the commodity price risk, since the 
fluctuations in the commodity prices affect the financier during the life time of the contract.  
 
Abedifar et al. (2015) identify three types of Islamic financing to date: i) debt based 
financing where the financier purchases or owns an asset and then sell it to a client at a 
mark-up rate which equals future rate of profit. The sale will be paid back by instalment(s) on 
a deferred basis ii) lease based financing is similar to debt based financing where the 
financier purchases or owns an asset and then rents it to a client. At the end of the rental 
period (or proportionate to payment), the ownership transfers to the client. iii) PLS financing 
departs from the first two in the sense that the financier is the partner of the customer and 
share the return (or loss) on a mutually determined proportion. In addition to interest (Riba), 
Islamic principles prohibit Gharar which is generally translated as excessive uncertainty. In 
financial transactions, for instance, any misconduct arising from information asymmetry is 
perceived as Gharar and prohibited. The other actions that are prohibited in Islamic 
jurisdictions, known as Haraam, are also impermissible in Islamic finance. Having business 
relation with companies who have involvement in alcoholic beverages, gambling etc. is 
therefore strictly prohibited. 
  
There is a growing interest toward Islamic finance specifically after the outbreak of the 
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global financial crisis, as Islamic banks were argued to be more stable finance houses (Beck 
et. al, 2013; Mohieldin, 2012, Farooq and Zaheer, 2015). However, the characteristics of 
Islamic finance do not surely put Islamic finance as a safe heaven. Both from institutional 
perspective and customer perspective, the outlook from Islamic finance on the risk behavior 
is mixed. Islamic finance is interestingly have number of factors that might work in opposite 
directions. 
 
Islamic banks are likely to have features that reduce risk by their nature. The religious beliefs 
of clients are expected to lead to greater loyalty to their banks and less withdrawal risk both 
of which have potential to improve bank soundness. There are nonetheless some institutional 
factors that might render Islamic banks more risky. In Islamic contracts, especially in the PLS 
ones, default penalties are limited and moral hazard incentives are larger. Although equity 
base of Islamic banks lead these institutions to have larger capacity to absorb losses, these 
operational limitations and poor risk management may render them less stable and risky.  
 
Religiosity in Islam can substantially influence customer behavior and can generate different 
patterns of risk too. The behavior of customers in Islamic finance indicate that they may 
show substantial risk avoidance on the one hand. To reveal the impact of Islamic beliefs on 
economic decisions, dual banking systems create a natural ground for comparison since there 
exists two alternative schemes offering similar products to its customers. Under such an 
environment, the evidence suggests that Islamic bank depositors are more sensitive to bank 
performance and demonstrate greater withdrawal risk (Abedifar et al., 2013; Aysan et. al, 
2017; Aysan et. al, 2018). Calling this phenomenon as displaced commercial risk, Islamic 
banks are widely recommended to hold higher cushion for higher volatility in their capital 
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base. Potentially with increasing religiosity, on the other hand, religious Islamic bank 
customers may show loyalty and thus mitigate the volatility exerted by greater withdrawal 
risk (Aysan et. al, 2018). The later view is supported by the behavior of Islamic bank 
customers in Islamic banks where they act as captive because Islamic banks stand as the only 
financial service provider to people who have reservation to conventional financial products. 
Borrowing the term from El-Gamal (2007), rent seeking Shariah arbitrage creates lucrative 
business environment for Islamic banks since at least some of Islamic bank clients are ready 
to pay rents for receiving unique financial services that are compatible with their religious 
beliefs (Kuran, 1983; Aysan et. al, 2018). To review the impact of religiosity on behaviors in 
Islamic finance, we assess the literature with the impacts separately for institutions and 
depositors. We thereby discuss the issue from customer and institutional perspectives in the 
upcoming sections.  
 
3.1.  Customer Behavior 
The impact of religious beliefs on economic decisions are rather scant in the scope of Islam. 
The major stake of evidence is from deposits market. A notable exception is Bursztyn et. al 
(2015) who find evidence that moral appeals are more effective than substantial monetary 
incentives as a means to enable debt repayment in a sample of credit card holders of a major 
Islamic bank in Indonesia. The authors study a field experiment by sending text messages to 
credit card holders to remind repaying their debts. The messages having quotations from the 
holy Quran is found to be effective. What is more is to explain the logic behind debt 
repayment in the field of religion is even more effective. This is interesting because apart 
from the impact of religion, the novel finding in that paper is the role of logic and justification 
in encouraging individuals to represent desirable financial behavior.   
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The impact of religiosity on financial behavior is generally inferred from the risk assessment 
of banks in general. The general tendency is that depositors show larger withdrawal from 
their banks against rising bank risk. As the past bank failures posited evidently, Islamic banks 
are not immune to bank runs and massive deposit withdrawals. Recent cases, in Turkey for 
instance, showed that Islamic bank depositors punish risky behavior by withdrawing their 
banks and letting the institutions to default (Aysan et. al, 2015, 2018; Çokgezen and Kuran, 
2015). The flourishing literature on the impact of religiosity on depositor behavior, in general, 
employ depositor (market) discipline literature as a theoretical baseline. 
  
The depositor discipline literature refers to a number of regulations in banking. Capital 
requirements of financial institutions, for instance, are the indispensable part of financial 
regulation and supervision. The requirements are in general quantified in function of the risk 
assessments of autonomous institutions, namely credit rating agencies. The level of capital 
that each financial institution has to hold is then specified by the risk exposure of that 
financial institution which is computed via ratings of credit rating agencies. Depositor 
discipline was pointed to be one of the complementary tool for prudential supervision as 
customers and investors support this line of regulation via individual monitoring.  
 
Depositor discipline is a natural market mechanism where bank customers, either depositors 
or other creditors, incentivize or penalize financial institutions based on their relative 
performance. This mechanism works in a way that depositors ask higher returns on their 
deposits and/or withdraw their funds with respect to deteriorating bank soundness. To 
discourage deposit withdrawals in a riskier bank, bank managers are expected to offer higher 
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interest rates on deposits in the short run and put their utmost effort to lessen bank risk in 
order not to pay high premiums in medium to long run (Flannery 1998, Park and Peristiani 
1995, Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001). 
 
The growing complexity of banking activities has been one of the culprits of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. The purportedly flawed credit ratings of various bank assets are widely 
believed to be one of the underlying factor in the buildup of the crisis (see e.g. 
Gültekin-Karakaş et. al, 2011; Duygun et. al, 2016; Eijffinger, 2012). Dissatisfaction with the 
performance of credit rating agencies has spawned reforms on risk assessments afterwards. 
The initiatives were in full agreement that proper due diligence practices which could 
maintain high quality individual risk assessment were necessary. Besides the rule-based 
regulations, the reforms after the global financial crisis specifically raised individual risk 
assessment again as a complementary, if not alternative, tool for risk assessment relied on 
market discipline. In a broader sense, it was intended to allow market participants to assess 
their own risk and reduce reliance on credit ratings (Duygun et. al, 2016; Eijffinger, 2012).  
Depositor discipline therefore partially transfers the burden of excessive risk taking and 
maintains a collaborative environment for financial stability. 
 
Although underlying element for depositor discipline is the risk profile of a financial 
institution, there are a number of factors that affect the disciplining power of market 
participants. This is mainly associated with the factors that impact individual risk perception. 
The literature so far, for instance, unveiled that disciplining is influenced by negative press 
reports (Hasan et al. 2013), regulatory signals (Iyer et al. 2013), social networks (Iyer and 
Puria 2012), bank scandals (Homanen 2018), and the perception that they are “too big to fail” 
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(Oliveira et al. 2014). However the literature is still scant how culture or in a narrower sense 
ethics or religious beliefs affects market discipline.  
 
As the Islamic finance also allows for market discipline as an important element in bank 
monitoring, the little known experience of Islamic banks spurred some interest as to whether 
market disciplining is potentially different from conventional experience. This potential 
difference also provides a fertile ground for discussion about the behavioral differences of 
religiosity. Starr and Yilmaz (2007) study the bank runs in Turkey with a specific incident of 
a bank run on Islamic banks (then, special finance houses) and raise the importance of 
deposit guarantee. Though the data set covers merely Islamic banks, the discussions are not 
extended to the role of religiosity.  Potential differences in the behaviors of depositors in 
Islamic banks, who are potentially investing in Islamic banks due to religious commitment, 
would exhibit how religiosity motivates individuals against risk. Aysan et al. (2017) propose 
that Islamic banks depositors also put disciplining even under the unique corporate structure 
of Islamic banks.  However the authors confirm that how this mechanism works in Islamic 
banks is not unequivocal. On the one hand, the evidence suggests higher risk aversion among 
religious individuals, the other line of evidence advocates loyalty of religious customers 
toward their banks. Aysan et al. (2017) argue that the loyalty might be more relevant to 
explain why religious reasons might have stronger explanation in Islamic bank depositor’s 
decision to sidestep conventional banks and to deposit funds to Islamic banks. Actually this 
was typically the main finding of Baele et al. (2014) who study the loan market in Pakistan. 
Their finding suggesting much lower default rates on Islamic loans than those on 
conventional loans was attributed to religious norms activated by signing an Islamic loan 
contract. Aysan et al. (2017) however show that an average Islamic bank depositor, just like a 
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conventional bank depositor, exercises disciplining on their banks. The revision of depositor 
insurance scheme during the sample period makes this disciplining even larger. Aysan et al. 
(2015) confirm the findings of that study and suggest that market disciplining is effective 
among Islamic banks in Turkey where the banking system is composed of conventional and 
Islamic banks. 
 
Though Aysan et al. (2015) and Aysan et al. (2017) find evidence of some similar behavioral 
pattern across Islamic banks depositors, the behavioral aspects of Islamic bank depositors are 
more explicitly discussed in a recent literature (Demiralp and Demiralp 2015, Aysan et al 
2018a, Aysan et al. 2018b). Demiralp and Demiralp (2015) study monetary policy change 
episodes to disentangle the behavioral differences among Islamic and conventional banks. 
The main objective of that study is to examine whether religiosity is an impediment to 
rational behavior. The authors argue that in many cases Islamic actors blend religious beliefs 
with rational behavior and find alternative ways of rationality. The authors further find that 
religious depositors show similar behavior as conventional bank depositors do. Specifically 
they find that during times of monetary policy changes, Islamic bank depositors and 
conventional bank depositors respond to these changes similarly.  Aysan et al. (2018) extend 
the discussion proposed by Demiralp and Demiralp (2015) by studying deposit clusters in 
their research. Deposit clusters vary according to the deposit size of depositors. The main 
conjecture is thus to analyze how deposit size (opportunity cost) affects depositor behavior. 
Their main expectation is that with bigger size of deposits the withdrawal tendency would be 
larger as well. The authors find that deposit clusters both in Islamic and conventional banks 
show significant responses to monetary changes. As expected, the responses are getting 
larger and more significant in larger deposit clusters. What is more intriguing is that deposit 
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clusters in Islamic banks show larger withdrawal tendency than deposit clusters in 
conventional banks. The authors explain this with unique behavior of religious depositors 
because while they maximize their returns and exhibit rational behavior they also seek to 
comply with religious codes. This finding also confirms the past evidence of Islamic 
bank-runs. Henry (2004) and Çokgezen and Kuran (2015) document that, during the collapse 
of an Islamic finance house in Turkey, depositors of that finance house did not differentiated 
from conventional bank depositors and practiced  a classic bank-run by instantly 
withdrawing their deposits. 
 
3.2.  Institutional Behavior 
The depositor’s behavior of Islamic banks toward their banks are related to bank-specific 
characteristics too. Having discussed, Islamic bank depositors are rational actors but why 
they are more averse to risk is partly related to unique banking practices of Islamic banks. 
Aysan et al. (2018) proposes some potential reasons as to why bank-specific characteristics 
are partly responsible for this behavior. The authors argue that the interest/return adjustment 
in Islamic and conventional banks are substantially different. As conventional banks can 
sharply and instantly change deposit rates, Islamic banks do not have this flexibility and are 
in general slower when they need to adjust their rate of return. The slowness in generally 
originates from the logic of Islamic banking where the returns are shared ex-post between 
customer and the bank. This inertia is argued to make Islamic banks more vulnerable to 
interest rate changes. Gerrard and Cunningham (1997) also provide evidence that interest 
rate shocks lead to deposit flows from Islamic banks to conventional banks in dual banking 
systems.  
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The lack of instant revision in return gives Islamic banks a substantial disadvantage as the 
customers exhibit greater withdrawal tendency against economic shocks that impact Islamic 
banks. As Islamic banks distribute returns ex-post, the economic downturns generally 
generate lower returns in Islamic banks, which these banks do not have tool to mitigate. The 
term commercial displacement risk partly refers to this phenomena as the displacement risk 
of funds provided by Islamic customers are in general high in bad times so the institutions 
seek alternative ways to increase the attractiveness of themselves. In addition to lack of 
instrumental tool to mitigate the impact of economic downturns, Islamic banks are 
significantly disadvantageous at due to their loan loss provisioning (Elnahass et. al, 2014). 
Loan loss provisioning in Islamic banks are stricter than conventional banks, as their strict 
loan loss provisioning models render them unable to flatten the adverse effects of business 
cycles. Although their unique dynamic provisioning models based on expected loan losses 
targeted as a partial remedy, these have not been fully adequate to curb the negative effects of 
business cycles. The recent findings also suggest that Islamic banks face larger liquidity 
restrictions than conventional banks, so the impact of recessions are generally coupled with 
severe asset and liability contraction among Islamic banks.  
 
Islamic banks involve in harsh price competition with their conventional counterparts by 
proposing similar returns to their depositors. This lead them to propose similar rates to their 
customers in the long-run (Haron and Ahmad, 2000; Chong and Liu, 2009; Ergeç and Arslan, 
2013; Ito, 2013; Demiralp and Demiralp, 2015, Aysan et. al, 2017; Aysan et. al, 2018). These 
studies implicitly argue that Islamic banks are in essence not a unique finance houses but just 
resemble conventional banks at least in their pricing behavior. A recent study by Cevik and 
Charap (2015) examines the deposit returns in conventional and Islamic banks in Malaysia 
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and Turkey and find that both returns show similar long term patterns (co-integrating 
relation). An interesting finding is the causality test results which show that returns in 
conventional banks Granger cause the returns in Islamic banks. Sukmana and Kassim (2010) 
and Zulkhibri and Sukmana (2016) examine, respectively, the behavior of Malaysian and 
Indonesian Islamic banks in their role of monetary transmission. Both of these studies 
conclude that Islamic banks in both countries are important players explicitly revealing that 
monetary changes alter returns in Islamic banks too. While Aysan et. al (2018) find that 
monetary changes create similar impacts in the long run, they also find that economic and 
monetary shocks instigate different adjustment paths in the short-term, because Islamic 
banks could lately respond to these shocks. Aysan et. al (2017) confirm the basic findings in 
Aysan et. al (2018) and extend their results to credit market. The authors find that as Islamic 
banks are affected by economic and monetary shocks more, the transmission mechanism is 
effective through loan market which results in more reduction in the volume of credits. 
 
Economic and monetary shocks are influential drivers for loan supply in Islamic banks. The 
general expectation is that loan supply in conventional banks tunes well with business cycles 
suggesting that during boom times banks tend to lend more while during bust times they 
reduce lending. Ibrahim (2016) suggests that pro-cyclical lending does not hold true for 
Malaysian Islamic banks and argues that with different definitions of loan supply definition 
and business cycle measure, Islamic banks lend counter-cyclically which means that they 
stabilize the fluctuations in overall credit market in the Malaysian banking system. The 
author concludes that Islamic banks with their unique raison d’etre to support socially 
responsible lending, they lend against the wind and mitigate the adverse effects of recessions. 
However, Aysan and Ozturk (2018) find that Turkish dual banking system as a whole 
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presents a pro-cyclical pattern in lending without any discrimination against or in favor of 
Islamic banks. The authors however explain their findings with different jurisdictions and or 
competition in the markets. The authors empirically find that competition can be a reason 
why Islamic banks also exhibit pro-cyclicality in the loan market. Their finding is in 
compliance with Ascarya and Karim (2016) who find that Islamic banks in Indonesia is also 
pro-cyclical. Aysan and Ozturk (2018) propose potential channels why Islamic banks are 
pro-cyclical. The authors argue that the dynamic loan-loss provisioning in these banks lends 
support for pro-cyclical lending. Higher capital for potential loan losses which is allocated 
for excessive capital flight as a results of displaced commercial risk, can lead these banks to 
reduce lending during recessions (Al-Deehani et. al, 1999; Hall et. al, 2000; Rosly, 2009; 
Daher et al, 2016). As these banks have less access to cross-border financing and other 
funding reserves, they are also heavily affected by recessions. However, as argued by Aysan 
and Ozturk (2018), if these banks constitute a small niche in the banking system, the size of 
the market can make these banks to focus on a dedicated customer and exercise a more stable 
intermediation.   
 
4. Conclusion  
Economic theory on general grounds disregard the impact of culture on economic decision. 
The relation between culture and economic decision is in general scantly investigated in the 
literature. The rising interest toward culture as an important element in economic decision is 
interesting though. Narrowing the wide avenue of research interest, in this short survey we 
presented the latest research on the impact of religious beliefs on financial actions.  
We presented a discussion the link between religiosity and financial behavior. Since the 
context is religion in a broader sense, we discussed the issue from conventional versus 
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Islamic finance. This has been an important vantage point because Islamic finance provides a 
unique finance platform for its customers. The uniqueness purportedly reflects in financial 
actions too.  
 
In a conventional finance base, we discussed how religion can constitute a normal basis in 
financial behavior. The norms sometimes facilitate financial decision that is generally 
manifested in conflict of interest, information asymmetries and various potential frictions in 
financial markets. We also discussed that, in addition to the findings in conventional finance, 
Islamic finance has unique behavioral traits. We proposed that the impact of religion can be 
disaggregated into customer and institutional. Having discussed that prohibitions in Islam 
lead to product diversification hence Islamic bank customers might feel captive to Islamic 
financial institutions and products. This form of captivity may render these economic agents 
as irrational. Although this might be a main motivation for a segment of customer, the 
literature generally suggests that customers of Islamic institutions exhibit rational behavior 
by blending their economic beliefs. We also proposed that seemingly different behavioral 
actions are in general borne out from institutional limitations. The lack of interest in Islamic 
transactions generally prevents Islamic financial institutions to instantly adapt to economic 
and monetary changes. So the delayed response of Islamic financial institutions creates 
potential behavioral differences.  
 
This paper is a modest attempt to survey the recent literature that explores one of the 
important themes in economic decision-making. Culture solely opens further avenues for 
future research in economics. We argue that despite a number of empirical studies that 
discuss the role of religion on the financial behavior of economic agents, more research is 
24 
 
needed. Potential discrepancies between religions on economic decision is also vitally 
important.  
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